Ukraine’s new recruits have returned from training camps all over Nato. Main battle tanks pledged over a frantic winter of diplomacy by President Zelensky – including Denmark’s entire stock of Leopards and a quarter of Britain’s deployable Challenger-2s – have been delivered. US Patriot missile defence systems are in place, and vast stocks of Soviet-made ammunition sourced from all over the world by Ukraine’s allies are trundling across the Polish border by rail. Ukraine’s much-anticipated spring offensive is about to swing into action with the stated aim, according to Zelensky, of pushing Russian forces off every mile of Ukrainian territory occupied since 2014.
Will they succeed? If the goal is to liberate Crimea and the rebel republics of the Donbas, the answer is almost certainly no, because to lose those territories would mean the end of Putin’s credibility, and with it his regime and quite possibly his life.
Many would argue that Vladimir Putin’s fall is exactly what is required for a safer world. But there are two practical reasons why a total Ukrainian victory is both impossible and dangerous. One is that though Ukraine’s military equipment, training, command and control and morale may be of far higher quality than Russia’s, Putin still commands vast quantities of armour, artillery, firepower and manpower. And in a slow-moving positional war, quantity beats quality. The other is that Ukraine relies entirely on Western-supplied materiel for her war effort, the lion’s share of which comes from the US – whose first priority right from the first White House intelligence briefings in the lead-up to the invasion is, in the words of US military chief Gen. Mark Milley, “to avoid a kinetic war with Russia”.
The US military and the decision makers of many major Nato members have not forgotten that Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Putin’s repeated hints that he may use tactical nuclear weapons to defend what he regards as “Russian territory” are to be taken more seriously the closer the front lines approach Crimea and the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk People’s republics, over whose defence the war was ostensibly launched. The US administration and, so far, the larger part of the Republican Party wants Ukraine to win. But America will not fight a world war over Donbas or Crimea.
That’s the pessimistic part. The optimistic view is that if one revises Zelensky’s definition of victory slightly, then Kyiv’s chances of winning look much better. Back in March and April 2022, Zelensky was ready to concede that the future status of Crimea could be discussed at a future date. He was also ready to abandon hopes of Ukraine becoming a full member of Nato in exchange for firm security guarantees from the alliance. And in the run up to the war, many senior Ukrainian politicians – including Zelensky’s first foreign minister Vadym Pristayko – argued that Kyiv would be better off amputating the rebel Donbas republics like a gangrenous limb. Pristayko was fired for expressing that heretical view, but the debate is likely to return with a vengeance during the endgame of this war. Some will argue, quietly at first, that Ukraine could actually be a more harmonious, united and secure country without a chunk of the Donbas populated by angry separatists who have spilled blood in order not to be under Kyiv’s control.
In late April, Zelensky told Nordic journalists that the war may continue for “decades”, even if the expected counter-offensive is a success. Decoded, this appears to hint at two hard realities. First, Zelensky realises that pushing the Russians out of all Ukraine is militarily unrealistic. And second, neither he nor any successor will sign a land-for-peace deal with the Kremlin.
Of course the hope is that the West will renew and even increase its military commitment for a further offensive in 2024. But though moral support for Ukraine is likely to remain strong, it’s doubtful that Western political will exists for supporting a forever war. During recent unrest in France many protesters demanded to know why Emmanuel Macron was funding Ukraine while claiming that the fiscal cupboard was bare at home. The leaders of Austria, Slovakia, Croatia and, most infamously, Hungary have already expressed concerns about funding violence, while “peace” movements in Italy and Germany are also growing. Both potential candidates for the US Republican presidential candidacy have spoken out against the scale and wisdom of arming Kyiv.
That leaves the most likely option of a Korea-style frozen conflict, with the new border running along a line of control established once both sides have fought each other to a standstill in 2023. This may save further bloodshed, but it would also leave a gigantic moral hazard. Putin’s aggression will have been, at least in part, rewarded. And as Zelensky has said many times, a frozen conflict could unfreeze at any time in the future, leaving Ukraine in a permanent state of insecurity.
Joe Biden’s answer is that Russia’s economy and military must be sufficiently degraded as to “never again be a threat to its neighbours”. Unfortunately, though, international sanctions have so far failed to impose the “severe and lasting economic costs” that Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, spoke of at the outset of the war. Instead of “massive, unprecedented consequences” predicted by Blinken, the Russians have proved adept at finding alternative means of importing everything from microchips and drones to iPhones and Parmesan cheese – as well as exporting their oil in large quantities via India and China.
For most Russians, the war has imposed few noticeable material costs, and the most striking impression I have had from visits to Moscow since the invasion is that the capital appears weirdly, almost disturbingly oblivious to the biggest conflict of the 21st century. Russia’s hawkish former president, Dmitry Medvedev, promised to produce 1500 new tanks this year which, if actually achievable, would be almost as many as those lost in the war to date and far in excess of the 100 or so provided by Nato to Ukraine.
Ukraine, then, has two paths to defeating Putin – either to persuade its allies to increase and upgrade their military aid indefinitely, or to revise their definition of victory. Putin, for his part, cannot hope to win this war. But he does have a realistic hope of not entirely losing it.
